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“S
tanding in two boats” is a Chinese 
idiomatic expression which means 
having difficulty deciding between 
two choices. To avoid choosing one and 
losing the other, one has to hedge, and 
commitment to either choice is half-
hearted. This phrase comes to mind when 
analysing the EU’s two most important 
external relations: with China and the 
United States.
EU-China relations have grown closer 
in some areas. Last year, China replaced 
the US to become the EU’s largest trading 
partner, and the two concluded a 
long-awaited investment treaty at the end 
of the year. China is also the EU’s 
strategic partner on issues such as 
climate change and clean energy 
transition. Both sides committed to 
implementing the Paris climate 
agreement and lead on climate action.
Multilateralism is core to both China’s 
and the EU’s approach to foreign policy. 
The same could not be said for the US 
under former president Donald Trump, 
who favoured unilateralism and 
isolationism. 
However, EU-China relations are 
facing challenges in several areas: first, on 
values such as human rights, religious 
rights and democracy; second, on 
economic issues such as market access, 
intellectual property rights and security 
questions on China’s hi-tech products; 
third, on macro political issues, such as 
state capitalism system and its Belt and 
Road Initiative; and fourth, on Beijing’s 
increasing role in Europe’s former 
colonies in Africa and Latin America.
Given these challenges, it is no surprise 
the EU identifies China as a competitor in 
the pursuit of technological leadership, 
and as a “systemic rival” promoting an 
alternative model of governance.
Meanwhile, the Europe-US 
relationship has been substantially 
weakened by a series of crises and a 
parallel change in US foreign policy as a 
consequence of its internal politics. 
In concrete terms, the transatlantic 
relationship is deteriorating as a result of 
the two sides’ widening gaps on policies 
and positions related to a range of global 
issues, international institutions and 
norms, multilateralism and even Nato.
Currently, the EU is facing a dual 
challenge from both “US exceptionalism” 
and “Chinese assertiveness”. In addition, 
EU-China relations are affected by the 
intense power struggle between China 
and the US, which will shape the trajectory 
of the global order for years to come. To 
maximise its interests, the EU’s best 
strategy is to bet on both sides.
EU think tanks agree that most 
member states want to uphold the values 
and norms they historically share with the 
US while wishing to economically benefit 
from engagement with China. They all 
consider the US to be their most 
important ally for military protection.
Ideally, the EU wants to keep a 
norm- and value-based coalition with the 
US to deal with Beijing’s influence and 
challenge, while it contends with the US’ 
“America first” in vital economic and 
geopolitical spheres of interest.
The EU’s strong awareness of keeping 
a balance between China and the US is 
clearly reflected by a recent public opinion 
survey in 11 EU countries, which shows 
that a majority preferred their country not 
to take sides in any conflict between 
Beijing and Washington.
The EU faces a dichotomy. On the one 
hand, it identifies itself as a defender of 
liberal idealism, as characterised by its 
identity as a “normative power”. On the 
other, it is also driven by realist 
materialism, epitomised by European 
Commission President Ursula von der 
Leyen’s ambition to lead a “geopolitical 
commission” which protects the EU’s 
hardcore interests, such as trade, 
technology, defence and the environment. 
Such a dichotomy means the EU is 
constantly “standing in two boats”. One 
boat justifies the realistic calculation that 
the EU needs to engage in external 
geopolitical and geoeconomic 
competition with both the US and China. 
To do so, it must be assertive in dealing 
with its political, economic, technological 
and security issues. Another boat 
rationalises the EU’s wish to maintain its 
ideational image as a “norm defender” in 
world politics.
To conclude, “standing in two boats” 
will eventually lead the EU to “pragmatic 
idealism” – a good balance between 
interests and values. Global 
transformation, the shift in the balance of 
power brought about by China’s rise, 
China-US rivalry and the EU’s internal 
changes, are all shaping and reshaping 
EU-China and EU-US relations. These 
relationships walk a fine line between 
partnership and competition, and 
between interest and value. 
The election of a new president will not 
fundamentally change US global interests 
and the shift in the balance of power. The 
US decision to impose sanctions on a 
company building the Nord Stream 2 gas 
pipeline from Russia to Germany on 
January 20, just as President Joe Biden was 
being sworn in, confirms Churchill’s 
teaching: “We have no lasting friends, no 
lasting  enemies, only lasting interests.” 
Likewise, the US cannot take it for 
granted that the EU will be a natural 
supporter to its “international democratic 
coalition” to contain China’s rise.
Professor Li Xing is director of the Research 
Centre on Development and International 
Relations, Department of Politics and Society, 
at Aalborg University, Denmark
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D
uring a G7 meeting on 
February 19, US President Joe 
Biden announced a US$2 
 billion donation to the Covax 
Facility, the global effort to 
provide vaccines for poor countries, with an 
additional US$2 billion in funding 
 contingent on contributions from other 
nations. 
The move was late in coming – and 
perceived by many as an attempt to repair 
the United States’ reputation and mend 
fences with the rest of the world following 
the Donald Trump presidency. It was, nev-
ertheless, a welcome move, giving a much-
needed financial boost to the Covax Facility.
Unfortunately, the Biden administra-
tion’s other decisions on health coopera-
tion are not endearing the US to the 
developing world.
For months, the US, together with the 
European Union and Britain, has opposed 
a proposal by India and South Africa at the 
World Trade Organization that intellectual 
property rules related to Covid-19 vaccines 
should be temporarily suspended. The 
waiver would allow drug makers in poor 
countries to produce generic versions of 
these vaccines to ensure their citizens’ 
timely access to vaccines. 
And yet, despite the fact that most coro-
navirus vaccines were developed with 
government funding or crowdfunded, 
wealthy nations like the US argue that the 
waiver would stifle innovation at pharma-
ceutical companies. This, in effect, robs 
poor countries of a chance to quickly roll 
out mass vaccinations, which would result 
in many avoidable deaths.
For this  reason,  World Health 
Organization Director General Tedros 
Adhanom Ghebreyesus last week blasted 
those countries for resisting the waiver. 
Calling on WTO members to waive intel-
lectual property rules and save lives in a 
once-in-a-century public health crisis, he 
said: “If not now, when?”
Increasingly, there is a sense in the 
developing world that the White House 
values the profits of American drug makers 
more than lives in other countries.
Then there is the vaccine hoarding in 
the developed world. According to an arti-
cle in The Lancet, rich nations, with just 16 
per cent of the world’s population, have 
pre-ordered 70 per cent of the doses of five 
major vaccine candidates available in 2021. 
These deals undermine the efforts of the 
Covax Facility to secure doses for poorer 
nations. Consequently, Ivory Coast and 
Ghana are the only countries so far to have 
received vaccines from the Covax Facility. 
Meanwhile, the US government has 
secured 600 million doses of vaccines from 
Pfizer and Moderna to be made by the end 
of July, and bought many doses of other 
vaccines. All told, enough advance orders 
have been placed to immunise every 
American twice over, while about 100 
countries do not have a single dose.
This brings to mind a scene painted by 
Tang poet Du Fu in an oft-quoted line: 
“Behind those vermilion gates, meat and 
wine go to waste; while out on the road lie 
the bones of men frozen to death.” 
The vaccine divide between developed 
and developing countries has prompted 
UN chief Antonio Guterres to call on 
wealthy nations to “share excess doses”. 
Last month, French President Emmanuel 
Macron suggested that the EU and the US 
allocate up to 5 per cent of their doses to 
developing nations, an idea that he said 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel sup-
ported. However, these calls have fallen on 
deaf ears in Washington. The US flatly 
refuses to donate its doses before it has an 
abundant domestic supply. 
China, although it is also under pressure 
to accelerate its vaccination programme at 
home, has gone to the rescue of other 
developing countries. It says it is donating 
vaccines to 53 countries and exporting to 
27. It is also providing 10 million doses for 
developing nations through the Covax 
Facility.
In countries such as Turkey and the 
Philippines, Chinese vaccines have been – 
and may continue to be for months to come 
– the only life-saving jabs available. 
And yet the US is “concerned” by this 
development. White House spokeswoman 
Jen Psaki last month characterised China’s 
efforts to help make affordable vaccines 
available to the world as “a means of 
 making progress diplomatically”. 
Such a view merely reflects the Biden 
administration’s narrow calculation of 
geopolitics. Washington has turned a 
worldwide public health issue into a matter 
of national rivalry and soft power. 
Apparently, containment of a country it 
sees as an adversary is more important than 
global containment of coronavirus.
But consider this: is it conscionable for 
someone who is loath to lend a helping 
hand himself to then try to stop other 
 people from putting out a fire in his 
 neighbour’s house – just because he hates 
to see the neighbour being grateful to them?
Again, one has to wonder if the Biden 
administration is more interested in 
 pursuing its own geopolitical goals than 
saving lives, not to mention livelihoods, in 
the rest of the world.
Furthermore, the current  administration 
appears to be taking the same divisive 
approach to international public health 
c o o p e r a t i o n  a s  t h e  p r e v i o u s 
administration.
Last month, White House National 
Security Adviser Jake Sullivan accused 
China of withholding information about 
the initial outbreak of Covid-19 from WHO 
investigators, a charge that members of the 
mission quickly refuted.
It is a plain fact that the world can’t beat 
the coronavirus without solidarity. Indeed, 
at a time when humanity is under assault, 
all countries should be united as one to 
fight the common enemy. To fail to work 
together is to enable the deadly virus to 
continue to claim lives and disrupt the 
world economy. 
Yes, America is back, all right – and 
repeating the same old stuff. The self- 
serving agenda, the disregard for other 
countries: it’s as if Donald Trump never left. 
If the Biden administration’s policy on 
 vaccination is the harbinger of things to 
come, it should be safe to conclude that US 
foreign policy will continue to be guided by 
geopolitical concerns instead of genuine 
issues such as the well-being of other 
 peoples and the proper functioning of 
international organisations.
 
Zhou Xiaoming is currently a senior 
researcher at the Centre for China and 
Globalisation and former deputy permanent 
representative of China’s Permanent Mission 
to the United Nations Office in Geneva
Zhou Xiaoming says Biden’s ‘America first’ vaccine policy is a harbinger of things to come
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The election system is to be overhauled to ensure only 
patriots can govern Hong Kong. Photo: Bloomberg
Michael Chugani says the requirement 
that only patriots can govern, without 
a clear definition, can be used by 
loyalists as a pretext for Cultural 
Revolution-style scapegoating
Keeping hope of 
democracy alive 
is a fools dream
K
eep hope alive. That was former US president 
Barack Obama’s campaign slogan. Keeping 
hope alive is not a hurdle in democracies. Those 
who loathe Donald Trump proved it by voting him 
out. Those who idolise him proved it by jam-packing a 
rally where Trump hinted at a comeback.
It requires courage to keep hope alive in 
authoritarian regimes. Yet the people of Myanmar are 
doing that, some by losing their lives, after a military 
coup toppled the government. 
I kept hope alive by believing Beijing would allow 
Hong Kong to move gradually towards true 
democracy. I reluctantly backed the government’s 
2015 reform package, based on Beijing’s 2014 
framework, as a first step. The opposition, which 
voted it down, labelled me a blue ribbon.
Now the blue ribbons, who comprise Beijing’s 
loyalist camp, say I have defected to the pro-
democracy’s yellow camp, which opposes Beijing’s 
tightening grip on Hong Kong.
I support both democracy and Beijing’s 
sovereignty over Hong Kong. They are not mutually 
exclusive. Beijing, obsessed with the false belief that 
an independence movement has taken root, doesn’t 
seem to grasp that. 
A headline in the Post said Beijing should let Hong 
Kong be Hong Kong. It encapsulated the soul of Hong 
Kong people. Letting us be who we are doesn’t mean 
subversion, secession, colluding with foreign forces, or 
being unpatriotic. It means preserving our free way of 
life that allows independent thought, a lively media, 
and right to protest.
 Western democracies now see us as an oppressed 
city under Beijing’s thumb, which has curtailed our 
freedoms with a sweeping but vague national security 
law. Beijing is expected to further alter Hong Kong’s 
DNA when the country’s parliament meets this 
weekend. It has been reported that top leaders will 
overhaul Hong Kong’s election structure to allow only 
patriots to govern. 
One possible change is to neuter the district 
councils, which the opposition controls after a 2019 
landslide, so its members can no longer be part of the 
Election Committee that selects the chief executive.
Another reported change is to allow only patriots 
to be district council and Legislative Council 
members. How will Beijing define who a patriot is? 
Legislators must already swear to uphold the Basic 
Law. The same will apply to district councillors. But 
that, apparently, isn’t enough to pass the patriot test.
Constitutional and Mainland Affairs secretary 
Erick Tsang Kwok-wai said people who were not truly 
patriotic had entered the system after elections. 
Beijing’s top official overseeing Hong Kong, Xia 
Baolong, said the election system must be overhauled 
to ensure only patriots can rule.
This is baffling. Some 1.6 million Hongkongers 
voted for the opposition in 2019, allowing it to sweep 
the district council elections. The opposition almost 
always dominates in direct Legco elections. 
If opposition candidates who won in free elections 
are not patriots, are the millions who voted for them 
also not patriots? 
Loyalists such as former Legco president Rita Fan 
Hsu Lai-tai and Legco member Priscilla Leung 
Mei-fun have suggested election candidates should be 
vetted before being allowed to run. What next? Patriot 
tests for teachers, parents, even street cleaners? Don’t 
these loyalists know that, in rushing to prove their 
patriotism, they are betraying the Hong Kong values 
they grew up with?
Last week, Beijing’s mouthpiece media attacked 
the newly promoted Permanent Secretary for Food 
and Health Vivian Lau Lee-kwan as unpatriotic for 
allegedly tolerating anti-government slogans on 
so-called Lennon Walls. Pro-Beijing legislator Regina 
Ip Lau Suk-yee defended her by pointing out a 
pending court case tied Lau’s hands. Ip urged against 
launching Cultural Revolution-style attacks.
I applaud Ip but fear Cultural Revolution-style 
scapegoating will come now that Beijing has declared 
only patriots can govern, without a clear definition. 
Keeping the democracy hope alive is fast becoming a 
fool’s dream.
Michael Chugani is a Hong Kong journalist and TV  
show host
Don’t these loyalists know 
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